impurity, flexibility, mongrel becoming, and disunity of the postmodern condition. 1 The globe itself is now "awash with American cultural icons" that are taking on a more local face and striving to affirm traces of a more "local" or "regional" voice in their transnational outreach. 2 Paris, Hong Kong, Mexico City, and Tokyo are flowing, as it were, through the neogeo frontiers, borderland becomings, and Asian/Pacific contact zones of California. 3 This brave new world of Asian and Pacific becoming belongs not so much to nay-saying Governor Pete Wilson nor to the monolingual corporatespeak of Microsoft, but to the affirmative, mongrel, and mixed-language poetics of Gloria Anzaldua and Lois-Ann Yamanaka in the process of becoming what he or she writes.
One need not invoke the stark forces of white cultural reaction at home (such as Allan Bloom) or economic ratification abroad (such as Kenichi Ohmae) to claim that many signs are already urging that modes of transnationalization and tactics of regionalization have transformed the contours of the u.s. national imagination with amped-up forms of geopolitical interaction, hybrid acculturation, and global exchange. Nations (or, on a connected if larger scale, "regions"; see chapter I on "Asia-Pacific" as such) are not just "imagined" into being by acts of political consensus, they are shorn from the past and all but dragged (singing) into the future by forms and forces of social restructuring, downsizing, cultural transfusion, willy-nilly abandonment, and political dissension. As David Reiffhas remarked of these transnational changes now effecting the molestation of Los Angeles into a Pacific Rim interzone ofheteroglossia, street rage, and cultural fusion, "The only part of the daily newspaper that made any sense at all was the business pages."4 What I will here be calling a "global/local" dialectical optic is needed to understand these strange new forms of contact culture emerging inside America, especially in such sites of Asian / Pacific and settler/indigenous interface as California, Texas, and (to be sure) Hawai'i, sites where transnational and postcolonial tensions are daily aggravated, written about, and policed. s " [President Bill Clinton] is not an American-he's a globalist!" one disgruntled male caller complained on a right-wing talk radio show in Honolulu (May 1996) , fed up with the influx of trans nationalism and multiculturalism he saw deforming the United States into a mongrel maze. As the crazed ex-Soviet cosmonaut in Armageddon (1998) puts it, frustrated as well by the transnational makeup of his makeshift crew and spaceship trying to protect the earth from collision with an asteroid "the size of Texas," "American components, Russian components, what's the difference? They are all made in Taiwan!" These days, the United States of America, as will be explored here early and late, is being remade in Taiwan, as Taiwan itself is being remade by contacts and flows from California and New Zealand as well as from Hong Kong and the Bronx.
As U.S. trade and cultural exchange across the Pacific at times surpasses that with Europe, much of this amped-up activity of transnational dynamism and global-cultural mix can be located in the area now being signified in neoliberal discourse as "Asia-Pacific" (see chapter I): a region of globalized space and "transnational imaginary" the United States has pushed westward toward and helped shape through the "frontier" mediation-and, in 1898, outright annexation-of Hawai'i as linkage to the vast markets and labor forces of Asia. 6 The production of Hawai'i into an American outpost of commerce and culture in the Pacific took place throughout the missionary and geopolitical dynamics of the nineteenth century, as I will trace from inside the conflicted space of Hawai'i its elfin chapters 2 and 3, stressing as well those "local motions" of contestation, mimicry, and resistance taking place via a willed reaffirmation of cultures of the local and indigenous national (chapters 4 through 7) that has been ongoing since the early 1970s.
These cultures of the local remain, given such a dialectical optic of global/local space, both conjoined and delinked from older imperial formations of continental nationhood and liberal modernity, in complex and changing ways that demand particularized articulation (see chapters 5, 6, and 7), in writers such as Lois-Ann Yamanaka, Eric Chock, Juliet Kono Lee, Barry Masuda, Rodney Morales, Carolyn Lei-Lanilau, Kathy Dee Kaleokealoha Kaloloahilani Banggo, Justin Chin, Joseph Puna Balaz, Wendy Miyake, and John Dominis Holt. This conviction of globalized space unhinging D .S. national from "local literature" identity is not just my own crazed attempt at cultural jeremiad. Even postmodern cities, by turns animated with the downsizing rhythms of postindustrial creative destruction and offshore dispersal, such as Los Angeles, Long Beach, Honolulu, Taipei, and "Kyoto-Osaka," have become fluid spaces of federal abandonment and transnational confusion dripping with the terror and wonder of street life in Black Rain and Blade Runner? It would take a Jackie Chan to find pleasure and achieve compass in this urban maze, or an Ackbar Abbas to find sublime distraction in the Hong Kong city life.
Transnational and postcolonial dynamics now interact in ways we have yet to come to terms with inside contact zones and overloaded sites ofD.S. culture. A hypernetworked India and market-oriented People's Republic (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), chap. 10, which builds on and extends the "Pacific Rim" discourse work of Christopher Connery, Bruce Cumings, and Arif Dirlik, which I myself am deeply indebted to and will respond to throughout this study. "Asia/ Pacific," as Christopher Connery has suggested to me in an analysis of this study, represents a step beyond "Pacific Rim" discourse into something less haunted by cold war othering and the heritages of binary "oriental" codes; for a more detailed analysis, see my chapters 1 and 8. 7 . For an affirmative analysis of this "global cultural economy" as crisscrossed by disjunctive transnational/local flows, see Arjun Appadurai, "Disjunction and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy," Public Culture 2 (1990): 1-24, as well as the darker Post-Fordist special issue of Socialist Review 21 (January-March 1991).
Introduction 5 of China have ended up, so to speak, flowing through the global-popular culture pores and computer industries of Southern California and North Carolina. Still, at any point, the cold war phobias threaten to return, and the Yellow Peril discourse of binary othering so attached to by canonical writers such as Jack London and W. Somerset Maugham (writing in the late-imperial Pacific) can be dragged out to police and spook the racial/ geographical borders between "us" and "them."
If the financial turmoil of 1997 and 1998 has suddenly resulted in currency attacks, IMF interventions, shaken optimism, and a palpable decline in tourism flow of some twelve million tourists, this may have (seemingly) given the lie to the up-with-transnational-capital teleology that was trumpeted in the fairly recent formation of the region as such (see chapter I). But the flows, exchanges, and dependency patterns have not abated in the contact zones (e.g., Hawai'i) of Asia/ Pacific: only the worries, and the promises, linger on the regional horizon as we enter these semiintoxicating waters of the "Pacific Century" and wander like baby Adams into the New Millennium.
Moves to contest prior and entrenched narratives of U.S. identity as dominantly Euro-American in makeup have proliferated inside borders of the national community as well. Forces of white reaction have only intensified the countercanonical recognition of Asian and Pacific, Latin and African movements toward recuperated identity and Native American constituencies working through, claiming, and contesting postcolonial terrains of "cultural hybridity." From a transatlantic perspective that goes on shaping the United States from Eastern and Caribbean shores, economic linkages and cultural migrations across the creolized diaspora and postnational hybridity materialize the disconnection of the United States and Great Britain from projects of nation-state modernity. Triangulated spaces such as those of "the Black Atlantic" or "the Asia/Pacific" can suggest the impossibility of shaping a white national identity fitted to some "morbid celebration of England and Englishness" or U.S. selves eternally tied to retrospective narratives of monolingual/monoracial unity.8 8. On discursive textures of these various postnational narratives and reimagined communities, see Homi K. Bhabha, "DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Nation State," in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (Routledge: London, 199°),291-322. More specifically, see Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease, eds., Cultures of United States Imperialism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994); and Lauren When the ambiguously transnational-Hungarian / English / Germancount-hero of Michael Ondaatje's English Patient remarks, "I came to hate nations. We are deformed by nation-states," his sentiment of cosmopolitical detachment reflects not just a belated romanticist's love of vast desert sublimity and disgust at the dehumanizing horrors of World War II, but the rootless disorientation, political trickery, and denationalized cosmopolitanism we are now living inside-postmodern nomads, as it were, on the other side of Dresden, Anzio, and Hiroshima (and, 1 should add, after our failed U.S. imperialism against such sites as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam).9 To find "America" today-if you were John Lennon returned to be interviewed about his own afterlife on an MTV chat room-you might say, "Tum left at Asia-Pacific," or "Find the dirty, magical waters of the Pacific Rim and just keep flowing."
As those prior narratives suturing "American" identity tend to break down and implode into politicized mazes of centrifugal heteroglossia, internal cultures of mongrel mixture, minority becoming, and local spaces have begun to fragment, disorganize, and become mixed even as they are fast circulated and stimulated (at another, more global level of image conquest) through the "hyper-geographical mobility of capital."lO As David Harvey points out, in his skeptical analysis of ongoing global/local patterns that are changing the nation-state into a disorganized transnational entity, the U.S. production system can no longer function as it did in the cold war framework of Pacific Rim discourse, that is, circulating within the global financial imaginary as "in effect the guarantor of international value" and nation-state power,u The dollar and yen seem, at times, to be coming unglued, even as the eurodollar tries to tie a mess of forces and codes into one system. Still, the superpower status and financial power of the United States cannot at this moment be glibly denied or, on the other hand, reified into some archaic imperial emporium spreading its "postrnodern global culture." Even George Soros, the global currency entrepreneur and Hungarian immigrant who has been instrumental (with all too cynical reason) in bringing "the Asian way" of capital expansion to its dollar-beholden knees in I997, has begun to worry that, perhaps, "the international financial system appears to be suffering a systemic breakdown" immune to moral censure, global intervention, or deregulated fix.12 At times, the socialized capitalism cum multiracial cultural hegemony of Singapore can look like a humane option of consensual control in relation to our own self-blinding theology of the free market as exported and installed under the global ideology of democratic consumption and profit expansion. 13 Situated globally or locally, what we still can mystify and glory in as "American" products in culture, origin, and design may now need to be interrogated as plural, impure, and entangled objects of national identity calling attention to their own more transnationalized construction and local $=ontention. In effect, the U.S. national imaginary will have to be remapped as a conjunction and becoming of global/local forces, as I hope to show in some detail. If American writing as such is forever in the breakdown process of "becoming minor" and expressing its multilingual entanglement in forces and peoples of geographical becoming, as Gilles Deleuze has claimed (in a tactic I will return to, embody, and examine), then this Asia/Pacific writing is a becoming other and elsewhere that is tied to a "becoming [that] is always 'between' or 'among'" energies and forces in the contact zones and borderlands. 14 12. George Soras, "Avoiding a Breakdown," Financial Times, 31 December 1997,1. This movement of "becoming Asia/Pacific" is fluid and palpable in what I call and will explore with some polemical irony and will to imperial decreation "the American Pacific." My aim, thus, in "reimagining the American Pacific" is both to dismantle stable U.S. hegemonic notions of identity, place, and region, and to create a kind of fluid and Deleuzian counterpoetics along lines of Asian/Pacific flight, place-based languages, and alternative imaginings. The culture of "America" may not be where it was located even a few decades ago. The "denationalization" of the world is not a fait accompli, as it seems to be on the business pages of the daily newspaper or Forbes magazine. But a trans nationalized cultural studies must come to more fluid (and critical) terms with these dismantled territories of place, identity, and community. "America" needs to be found, as well, offshore and over the ocean, where identity flows and deforms and creativity takes place along a line of flight across the older world-system geographies of New England and Canton province. IS Culture is not just rooted but rerouted, as James Clifford, Karen Kelsky, Arjun Appadurai, and others have shown, by the new media that extend our sensory apparatus and flow across our borders of identity. What is good for post -Fordism may be leading toward the makings of some "postAmerica," for to be transnationalized American-style now means to become post-Fordized as cultural subject of the nation. 16 A nagging question remains on the U.S. cultural studies agenda: How does one find this (more borderless and impure) "America"?
Boundary zones, peripheral spaces, and local enclaves of cultural production and identity location-that would affirm forces and sublanguages of social contradiction, impurity, and ethnic difference-are emerging as powerful new spaces of national reinvention. This is palpable in the cultural formations underway in the Asia-Pacific region, where "local" and IS. On "global" flows of poststructural theories of decentered identity as well as tech· nologies of virtual space and financial speculation impacting on "local" spaces as a "postmodern" cultural formation of global capital, see Vincent B. Leitch, Postmodernism: Local Effects, Global Flows (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), esp. chaps. 1 and 12. 16. As Antonio Gramsci reminds us about industrial regimes of hard labor cum Puritanism in "Americanism and Fordism," "The 'subaltern forces,' which have to be 'manipulated' and rationalized to serve new ends, naturally put up a resistance" (279). See Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International, 1985) .
"regional" cultures of reconstituted postcolonial "english," residual oral forms, and non-Western mythology, for example, have surfaced across ethnic barriers and disparate spaces to contest those canons of national oblivion and transnational hegemony.17
One sign of this altered ethnoscape of cultural location is the geopolitical assertion of "Asian/Pacific," to invoke the region my argument will substantiate from different critical angles, by means of articulating the "local literature" movement underway in the postcolonial state ofHawai'i, where English, despite its dominance since the r840s as language of government command and since the late r890s as language of public instruction, can still be considered by Hawaiians as ka '6lelo haole (the foreigner's tongue). Pidgin English has become the medium of center-periphery reversal and postcolonial flows. In "offshore" Taiwan, as well, English also becomes the language of transnational mixture and cultural flows, challenging and deforming the national hegemony of the KMT's Mandarin Chinese and the recent emergence of Taiwanese as lingua franca of everyday transactions in the "global city" of Taipei (see chapters rand 8).
At several key points, early and late, I will further this theorizing of the American national-local discourse by looking not at Hawai'i but at the complicated Pacific Rim space that is contemporary Taiwan, an island space and territory of cultural-political identity and creative flows perilously established "in the pores of the [three) empires" that are China, the United States, and Japan. 18 This emerging "Asia-Pacific" space represents a very contradictory region of entrenched multiplicity and mixture, reg- istering-and, at times culturally, resisting-the spreading neocolonial forces of trans nationalization that have been christened by Akio Morita of Sony as a cheery process of "global localization," but that can be called, in dialectical fashion as well, the cultural space oflocal globalism. 19 Ang Lee, the globally successful and locally problematic Taiwanese film director of Pushing Hands (1992), The Wedding Banquet (1993 ), Eat Drink Man Woman (1994 , and Sense and Sensibility (1995) , has captured the strangely rooted yet diasporic mixture of being Taiwanese yet becoming American, by default as it were. "In the process of Westernization," Lee claimed in an interview in 1993, "Taiwanese people have already done many of the similar kinds of work that immigrants would do. Although their bodies are not in the United States, they are immigrants psychologically .... What is the difference between living in Flushing, New York, and Taipei? Except that one knows America better and sees more Americans, there is not much difference."2o Taipei, as "global city" of Asia/Pacific conjunctions, is always on the trans/national road to Mainland China, America, and Japan. 21 Taking an expressly situated view of (trans)national location, Pacific islanders now emerge as cultural and economic agents constructing their past and contesting their future rather than succumbing to any neoMarxian dependency model or the cultural neoromanticism of certain elites. The cultural nationalisms surfacing across the region, as in New Zealand and Hawai'i, need to be situated and assessed within the larger dynamics of the decolonizing Asia/Pacific region. The dynamism of global/local forces will intensifY as Asian/Pacific cultures look inward for validation and sources of invention, remapping, and national fracture in such places 19 . See Ohmae, The Borderless World, 93, 9. Introduction II of uneven modernity as Hawai'i, Taiwan, and New Zealand, where what Arjun Appadurai calls the "Trojan horse nationalisms" of white settler states can threaten to implode with emerging counterclaims on nationstate identity and social formation by indigenous/multicultural nationalisms linked to prior formations, symbol systems, and alternative lineage of cultural identity at once constructed yet more attuned to place forms and primordial attachments. 22 Given these contexts of space-time compression, "localization" of global, regional, and national forms can be seen to take on two distinct yet interacting senses. First, localization, in the postmodern marketing sense of Sony's Morita and the Harvard Business Review, means the rejection of object uniformity and assumptions of product universality; instead, objects and images will have to adapt to local communities and reflect regional tastes and subnational spaces to become "expressive." Simulation of the local can, in this global process, displace more authentic, mythic, or place-bound representations of cultural identity. In a counterhegemonic or more critical sense, as well, localization will here refer to the process of differentiation by means of which regional and local cultures can recognize the global design and world market and yet assert alternative spaces, sublanguages, and local identities grounded in the otherwise and elsewhere. This Pacific local cannot be all that easily consumed or customized by the outreach of global capital, as it links up with and deforms global products and designs.
Reflecting on the "politics of difference" being constructed in local/ national sites along (and inside) the Pacific, Meaghan Morris inventively articulates postcolonial Australia as a complex space of cultural production in which the local, aboriginal, and regional pulls are implicated and activated, rather than merely dominated and absorbed by Euro-American globalism or white settler nationalism: "If one is to act nationally and regionally while thinking internationally in the Pacific Rim today, there are gulfs of language as well as political, social, and cultural 'tradition' to be 22. On "Trojan nationalisms" of modernity ready to expand and implode into globalj local contestation from Canada and the USA to Japan and India, see Arjun Appadurai, "Patriotism and Its Futures," Public Culture 5 (1993): 4II-29, as well as speculations on the paradox of "constructed primordialism" and the global production of locality as identity space in Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). negotiated, chasms of ignorance and indifference, gruesome histories of imperialism and racism to be confronted, and the consequences of Australian and American unions' past complicity in the destruction of Japanese and Korean labor movements to be faced."23 The local, articulated in Morris's grounded sense, as tied to national and regional forms of placebound identity and political community, can still affirm the possibility of global difference and national contestation. The Pacific local, in this wary critical sense of situated articulation, can become a way of bringing historical countermemory to bear on the making of the Euro-American nation through its uniform narratives, mores, and seamless traditions. The local, projected as alternative space and registering those other (Deleuze: "minor") languages and countermemories to the "white mythology" or white settler imaginary of the nation, can become a strategy of multicultural affirmation and, at the strongest extreme of assertion, urge indigenous survival and forms of counternationhood.
Microelectronics, computerized technologies, and mass tourism will compress the globe through relentless interaction and cultural interchange. Still, at times, the staggeringly complex cultures in the Pacific Basin and Pacific Rim will push toward maintaining some measure of local determination: to preserve locations that offer, as David Harvey registers within the dynamics of postmodern capitalogic, "multiple possibilities within which a spatialized 'otherness' can flourish."24 When Paul Theroux interviewed the king of Tonga, Taufa'ahau Tupou IV, for example, and asked the last monarch remaining in the South Pacific about his plans to unify Polynesia into a coherent region as the Hawaiian king David Kalakaua had once tried to do (and failed) in the neonativist 1880s, the 
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Tongan king answered by embracing the "politics of difference" of an Oceanic postmodemist. My aim in such a project, replied the king, "is not political. How could it be? The Cook Islands is a republic. Hawai'i is a state. French Polynesia is a colony. Tonga is a monarchy. There are too many differences."25 At a time (1991) when France still went on testing nuclear weapons in the reefs of Polynesia and the USA was discarding its cold war arsenal in the Johnston Atoll and toppling Saddam Hussein in Iraq with Patriot missiles, rather than conjure some rival vision of political or economic homogenization, the king of Tonga said he would promote this Oceanic unity of Polynesia through the formation of a new magazine-of culture and the arts! (In using such cultural tactics, the king was mimicking a method of regional linkage and survival initiated by Albert Wendt of Samoa, Epeli Hau'ofa of Tonga, and Marjorie Crocombe and Subramani of Fiji, among others, in the 1970s.)
Given these very dynamics of transnational production within a postmodemf"postcolonial" world system that would consume, demobilize, and mimic resistance at the local level of culture, Arif Dirlik would give special weight to the significance of an emergent "critical regionalism" in its ability to forge local spaces of difference and social tactics of resistance. "The reaffirmation of the local that I am speaking of here is that 'critical localism,''' Dirlik argues, "which, even as it subjects the present to the critical evaluation from past perspectives, retains in the evaluation of the past the critical perspectives afforded by modernity. Excluded from this localism are romantic nostalgia for communities past, hegemonic nationalist yearnings of a new kind (as with the so-called Confucian revival in East Asia), or historicism that would imprison the past."26 Given these uneven powers of postmodernity inside the global cultural economy and the political complications of "postcoloniality," we cannot go back to the future, that is, to preserving the culture of some nativist nation-state or to maintaining some precapitalist illusion of equality, racial purity, and cultural homogeneity. Still, even as stronger, virtual, and more devious versions of hyper cap ital command the contours oflocal space, time, and value, we do need to hold out for some particularized places and enclaves of cultural production in which "the 'othernesses' and 'regional resistances' that postmodernist politics emphasize can flourish."27 Stressing and pressurizing the local as a site of "critical resistance" posits a more dynamic way of imagining the relationship of region, nation, and globe in which difference is not subsumed nor reified but circulated and affirmed. Readings of "local knowledge" that would ignore the larger macropolitics of context or suppress, at times, the neocolonial (or transnational) dynamics of uneven development can all too unconsciously serve to ratifY the market-driven nation-state as space and goal of modernization. 28
Within this globalizing economy, cyborgs of transnational Japan and the "global city" of Kyoto-Osaka (or the Science and Industrial Park of Hsinchu, for that matter) can be intimately related to the local cultures and byproducts of Australia and Africa. Cyborgs across the Asia/Pacific help to figure spaces of postmodern cultural production. Answering the question of workaday and temporal disjunction, "How can I, toiling away in the teeming city of Tokyo , have any true sense of relationship with a primitive tribesman living in the wilds of Africa?", Masahiro Mori uses the creativedestruction force of the robot to figure the global interaction of these disparate spaces of production. Founder of the Robotics Society of Japan and the Mukta Institute of transpersonal creativity, Mori writes in The Buddha in the Robot, "When I start to make a robot, I have to gather 27. Harvey, The Condition of Post modernity, 239. 28. For a critique of U.S. ethnography as insufficiently situated "local knowledge" affiliated to a geopolitical misrecognition of Sukarno's overthrow in Indonesia, see Vincent P. Pecora, "The Limits of Local Knowledge," in The New Historicism, ed. H. Aram Veeser (New York: Routledge, 1989), 243-76. Pecora maintains that Indonesian "local culture," caught up in a postwar struggle for self-determination against American intervention, needs to be situated "in the larger context of cold-war, East-West geo-political conflict" (256). Regarding the dynamics driving "the local/global cultural dialectic," James Clifford warns that the ethnographer of "thick description" should beware of localizing narratives, that is, warding off into a historical essence "what is actually a regional/national/global nexus" (roo). See "Traveling Cultures," in Cultural Studies, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler (London: Routledge, 1992 ).
Introduction 15 materials: a motor or two, some aluminum sheet, steel bands, transistors, copper filaments, and so on. A robot is made by putting these components together according to one scheme or another, and if we are to understand the robot fully we must understand the parts. What are they? Where do they come from?"29 Decomposing the robot's "Japanese" national identity into local/global subject, Mori deconstructs the national origins of this postrnodern individual, the Japanese cyborg, as a process of economic interchange linking North to South, science to religion, body to spirit, technology to earth, global to local: "Where does the iron ore come from? It is mined in the mountains of Australia, China, and Africa, and brought to Japan in cargo vessels. Africa? Yes, Africa. Through the steel and the iron ore, the robot I am making is related to the home of the African tribesman I speak of" (28) . Decomposed of national origin and unfixed of private identity, the robot/cyborg figures in Mori's reading, finally, as a Buddhist transnational subject. "I believe robots have the buddha-nature within them-that is, the potential for attaining buddhahood," Mori contends, theorizing this most postmodern Japanese subject, for whom imperialism and war are over (13) . Interfacing human and animal, spirit and technology, physical and immaterial, cyborg workers break down the boundary of the local/global and dissolve the nation-state into configurations of the transnational future.
This cyborgian foture is, in some respects, already spreading across the "Asia / Pacific" region of transnational production. Whereas earlier forms of nation making pushed the evolution of the nineteenth century toward horizontal solidarity and imagined community, it is becoming clear, in attempts to map the dynamics of postmodern spatiality, that the motions
Masahiro Mori, The Buddha in the Robot: A Robot Engineer's Thoughts on Science and
Religion, trans. Charles S. Terry (Tokyo: Kosei, 1981), 28-29. While linking the cyborgsubject to the "contradictory, partial, and strategic" identities of American socialist feminism, Donna Haraway contends from a space of feminist/socialist mobility that "the cyborg is a kind of disassembled and reassembled, postrnodern collective and personal self" (163). See "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and SocialistFeminism in the Late Twentieth Century," in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991) . Theorizing the international division and "feminization" oflabor forces and spaces ("homework" space) that the cyborg helps to install, Haraway contends, "Cyborg gender is a local possibility taking a global vengeance" (181). and flights of transnational capital entail the dis invention of the bounded "nation-state" as we know it into a less stable, more fungible and heteroglossic entity.30 At least such a process is underway in countries situated in the First World of postmodern capitalist culture, such as the United States, France, Australia, Great Britain, and Japan. What some transnational economists would now embrace as a borderless, open, decentered, and interlinked economy of Japan, the United States, and Europe has, in the upbeat Pacific Rim analysis of Kenichi Ohmae, "made traditional national boundaries almost disappear, and pushed bureaucrats, politicians, and the military toward the status of declining industries."31 "Almost" does not mean "already" here, to be sure: the process of installing this "global web," to support a borderless commodity culture liquefied in the First World economy of scale and speed, is complicated and contested, from Birmingham to Melbourne, at the level of everyday culture and space. Still, the transnational doors keep opening to the dirty waters and El Nino winds; spaces shrink and grow more porous, from Honolulu to Taipei and Auckland and beyond.
In the subject-formation of the United States of America that will inform (and deform) the argument of this little book, this big process of global linkage will suggest the disuniting of the postindustrial states and subjects of the American e pluribus unum polity into multicultural, racial, and neoregional forces of disidentification, discontinuity, reclaiming, and decentering. As one precondition for the formation of democratic modernity as such, the political conviction of nationhood as an "imagined community" served, over the troubled course of two centuries, to unite diverse selves of linguistic, ethnic, religious, and territorial diversity (whom Bene-30. On older and various Euro·American formations, see E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990),23-31. Ohmae, The Borderless World, xi. Given the interplay of the global with I against the local that Ohmae's work would ratify as a win-win process of transnationalism, economic and cultural forces rapidly feed off and back into each other. We see the rise of capitalogic models to explain these placeless and dehistoricized cultures of postrnodernity (as in the theories of Fredric Jameson and David Harvey). Although such models are often accused of being refiectionist in orientation, it is now often difficult to differentiate the first set of global changes as strictly "economic" from a second or national set as purely "cultural." dict Anderson calls the "creole pioneers" of populist nationalism in the New World) into some teleology of shared power and collective purpose. 32 As a master narrative for this tacit process ofidentity formation, "Americanization" of citizens implied not so much a stigma or a negation as a utopic self-construction, in part dependent on a liberal discourse of democratic interpellation. Identification with national power and polity took place for the democratic subject not only in the ballot box and at the shopping mall, but, more variously, in the everyday and aesthetic practice of identifying with the sublimating energies of the nation: some vast landscape such as Niagara Falls or the Western plains, some icon oftechnological might such as the moon landing or the transcontinental railway, or "the people" itself seen as some intoxicating social glue of mass conglomeration as in Whitman's "Song of Myself," secured a conviction of American national subjectivity. As one such time-honored discourse of "Americanization," the cultural genre of the "American sublime" evolved through the course of the nineteenth century in canonical authors of white settler mythology such as Emerson, Bryant, Whitman, Church, and Stevens, as I have argued elsewhere, to secure a conviction of national empowerment and cultural identity as founded in the illusion of empty space, or a terra nullus (as claimed in white Australia to displace aboriginal land rights) ripe for the saturation of Euro-American power and representation. 33 Democratic identification with the sublime power of nationhood, dependent on some trope of aboriginal legitimacy and first possession, is fast coming apart at the cultural seams. Even the Grand Canyon, or what Morton Kondracke has called the whole ideology of "Grand Canyonism" invoked by the discursively inept George Bush reelection campaign in 1992 to shore up the national power of its disoriented and postideological presidential subject, can no longer serve as awesome instruction scene of national unity and self-transcendence to heal race, class, and gender divisions through sublime spectacles of American exceptionality.34 Lawrence Kasdan's 1992 movie Grand Canyon gathered its characters at its closure before the Grand Canyon scene to heal, if only symbolically, the class and race divisions riddling Los Angeles before that same city, as paradigm of postrnodern global space, erupted (later in 1992) into apocalyptic fires of local abandonment and international molestation. Ignoring the cynical reason of the Hollywood movie producer (played by Steve Martin), who used the Grand Canyon as a metaphor for the gulf that separates upscale white America from the black slums, the white lawyer (Kevin Kline) and black truck driver (Danny Glover) gather wives and children from the city to gaze in awe at the Grand Canyon as if sharing some primal ground of national conviction and cultural belief.
The "American sublime" as an aesthetic conviction of national empowerment for self/ community /landscape, is supposed to work like this, the commonsense trope of primal natural infinitude in Grand Canyon implies, signifying our connection to the vast unifying wilderness of Arizona, a space unlike the tormented and terror-ridden ghetto of South Central Los Angeles. But, in an era of the decentered, flexible, and globally entangled production taking place across transnational cyberspace, when the "American company knows no national boundaries, feels no geographic constraints,"35 can the appeal to a Fordist economy of scale, where size represents national strength and power is materially embodied in products of national identity, appeal with the same ideological conviction? Gone are innocent days of a postwar American movie like Niagara (1953) , when the passionate (always excessive) body of Marilyn Monroe as phallic woman could compete, as semiotic image, with the power and treachery of the national falls (sublime wilderness) to embody the newfound hegemonic power of the United States as global force. 36
Despite nostalgia for this nineteenth-century aesthetic of nationhood as 66-82. objectified in an imagined community and shared landscape, the local and the transnational will, in different ways and with distinct tensions, pull apart the "Grand Canyonism" of the American nation as we now know it, dismantle local regions, and forge transnational alliances that cut across traditional allegiances to place, group, class, and social community. This is not meant to proclaim postliberal prophecy nor to invoke transnational paranoia, but to register cultural description based on an investigation of social motions and cultural selves already circulating in the United States as these are displaced and transformed in national genres and, as regional forms, in the American Pacific.
Mapping the reformation of the "American Pacific" from within the militarized yet tourist-friendly sites of South Pacific and Pearl Harbor, as linked to ethnic and indigenous energies of Bamboo Ridge, I will focus on cultural conjunctions of global/local space as these impinge on the symbolic coherence of American national identity. To map the changing dynamics of local culture in the American Pacific, I will go on to theorize the emergence of the "local literature" movement in Hawai'i. This micropolitics of cultural identity will be linked to larger postcolonial and regional tactics of coalition in the Asia-Pacific region: a new regionalism imagined and contested, as it were, along a Honolulu-Taipei line of flight. In this large-scale or regional reframing, I will situate this local movement at Bamboo Ridge within the geo-imperial dynamics of the American Pacific, as this was constructed during the nineteenth century and as a reflection of decolonizing dynamics in the contemporary Pacific. As such, I challenge (residually) "orientalist" representations or cold war productions of the Asia / Pacific as a South Pacific fantasy of the region through an analysis of American interactions with the offshore nation of Hawai'i. This particularized focus on the emergence of an Asia/Pacific America, via Hawai'i as space of multicultural mediation between California and Asia flows, will help to measure these motions of the local, national, and transnational imaginary. These "local motions" are conjoined in ways that reveal unequal flows of information and power. The Hawaiian indigenous movement demands a more complete hearing inside this socalled American Pacific. This is one way to answer the question, How do you find America today?
Epochal changes in postrnodemist modes of production need to be linked to changes in modes of cultural reproduction within the political imaginary of America itself, and a discussion ofliterary and filmic cultural genres will allow me an entry into mapping these social dynamics. It was only two decades ago, during the struggle for Asian hegemony in the Vietnam era, that authors of Oceania and the Asia/Pacific could still be anthologized as so many "technicians of the sacred," that is, as mythic subjects expressing premodern communities, unconscious forces, aboriginality, and ancient language-games. 37 First World hunger for "techniques of the sacred" or for mythic transformation of everyday banality will no longer suffice as cultural description in the Pacific; in contexts of postmodern performance and constructed primordialism, even hula kilhiko (ancient hula, or "hula of old") can signifY the resurgence of the Hawaiian culture within structures of state control, subaltern humiliation, and tourist consumption. 38 There has been a more recent turn within the local literary culture of Hawai'i toward tapping into this deeper cultural resonance of place and language as willed ground of invented identity, sought after by renewing contact with the Hawaiian language and its archive of myths and orature, that "unwritten literature" as Nathaniel Emerson called nil mele 0 Hawai'i (the songs and chants of Haw ai' i). At the same time, given global competitiveness and a nagging sense of cultural dislocation, as I have suggested in 37. See Jerome Rothenberg, ed., Technicians of the Sacred: A Range of Poe tries from Africa, America, Asia, and Oceania (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969; revised and expanded 2d ed., Berkeley: University of California Press, I985). Even a liberal travelogue from this myth-drenched era provides a more historicized view of "Oceania" as site of decolonization, and argues that militarization has turned Hawai'i into "a sugar-coated fortress, an autistic Eden, a plastiC paradise in which the militarism and racism of the American empire are cloaked by a deceptive veil of sunshine and flowers" (I2I); see Francine du PIes six Gray, Hawai'i: The Sugar-Coated Fortress (New York: Vintage, I973), which also contains a portrait of the Hawaiian sovereignty struggle tied to protests in Kalama Valley as it was being suburbanized (I25-45). Gray's claim that "the [Hawaiian] nationalist movement will grow in numbers and in identity" (I28) will be supported in my analysis. my preface, the Hawai'i Visitors Bureau goes on placing greater emphasis on the "aloha spirit" as a marketing device, which means, for instance, teaching hotel workers to smile at tourists, using real flowers in rent-a-car lobbies, and putting in free baggage carts at the Honolulu International Airport. As deeper resonance and gesture of reinvented Pacific authenticity, the local has become a contested terrain of Hawaiian cultural expression subject to strange appropriations, politicized reification, and multiple contestation, as I hope to make clear. One hundred years after the annexation of Hawai'i in 1898, very few in the U.S. island state are celebrating and many more are mourning an act of republican absorption that was protested by over twenty-one thousand Hawaiians to no avail in the era of U.S., European, and Asian imperialism in the Pacific. 39 My focus, finally, will tum to tracking emergent spaces and genres of transnational interaction that would link the localism and indigenous nationalism of Hawai'i to the globalism and flows of the Asia-Pacific region, which goes on being constructed and redefined even as I write (chapters 4 and 5). In chapter 6, I invoke the shark gods of the precolonial imaginary of Hawaiian literature to contest the tacit makings of Hawaiian reality as (American) real estate. In chapter 7, I go on to read the locally produced movie rooted in the tensions of Hawai'i, Good-bye Paradise, as a social text from the American Pacific that reflects this interface of global forces and local resistance and, as such, refracts the micro politics of a racially mixed and troubled Hawaiian polity. In chapter 8, I tum back to articulate what it means to "become global and local" while creating inside what is being called "the transnational imaginary" in such spaces of cultural production as Honolulu and Taipei. (My own identity as local writer and Pacific cultural critic will be dispersed, interrogated, and implied throughout this study.)40
Global, considered as a dynamic of the Asia-Pacific, here presumes (for The end-of-century United States, as I will be suggesting, will move toward implosive and impure ends: the end of "America" as a bounded entity /identity and its transformation, meltdown, and reimagining into a postmodern object of ideological desire in which the local, national, and global are more actively interfaced in "Asia-Pacific." Given the global web of American postmodernity, national products have become transnational composites; this will have to affect the very way we look at everyday American culture, cultural studies as such, and American studies in the era of the transnational imaginary. 42 Although it may reflect a cultural conviction and linger on as sublime object of ideological desire, "America" is not so much the fixture of a national government or bounded cultural space as it is a transnational corporation with local rootS.43 It may not always be so, but this is how it feels to create "America" today from an angle of vision rerooted in the Pacific. Mark Twain warned, while writing up Hawai'i as a good plantation investment, missionary outpost, and tourist site fit for American readers from California to take over, profit by, and enjoy as we set out to tread these expansive, dream-laden waters: "It was such ecstasy to dream and dream [in the Pacific]-till you got a bite. A scorpion bite."44 Writing a kind of ad copy for the islands, Twain poked fun at "our fellow savages in the Savage Islands" as he made a killing on the national lecture circuit doing so, at the same time supporting missionary and commercial forces that were mounting toward U.S. annexation of Hawai'i as blessed tourist isles full of sugar money and Edenic dreams of bodily bliss. The superpower market-state that is the United States of America is, by now, fully immersed in the contemporary construction of "Asia-Pacific" as a post-cold war and globalizing region. "Asia/Pacific" represents an advance beyond "Pacific Rim discourse" (as described by Christopher Connery) in that it bespeaks a transnational community ofliberal porousness and space-time compression, where market-driven coprosperity and democratic nation-states will have come home to coexist; where North/South colonialism, orientalizing binaries, and world war are said to get washed away forever in the magical waters of the Pacific. (The slow "rise" and sudden "fall" of "Confucian capitalism" during recent years, aggravated by our neoliberal policies, suggests how much of a scorpion the marketdriven and web-drunken system of transnational globalization can be, turning back to bite its strongest proponents.)45 43-On "postnational" /transnational transformations impacting on the cultural economy of national identity and "American studies" as field imaginary, see the two special editions of boundary 2, The New Americanists, ed. Donald Pease, 17 (1990) and 19 (1992) ; and Paul Bove, "Notes towards a Politics of 'American' Criticism," in In the Wake of Theory (Middletown, Cf: Wesleyan University Press, 1992) , 48-66; "American" is placed, to be sure, in wary scare quotes. 
